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Ordnance recognition is a key compo-nent of all EOD training, although some nations focus more on individ-
ual items while others stress the characteris-
tics of generic groups. Either way, technicians 
soon learn to identify the more common types 
of ordnance within their areas of operation, 
but it takes far longer before they can recog-
nize internal components, or the effects they 
cause. Learning to read the signatures of these 
munitions can help technicians improve their 
ordnance-identification skills.
Signature Recognition: Reading the 
    Signs of Explosive Ordnance 
by Colin King [ C King Associates, Ltd. ]
Signature recognition can be a valuable tool for identifying types of ordnance em-
placed, clearing ordnance and enhancing mine-risk education. Additionally, it aids 
medical professionals in determining the cause of injury and can identify illegal 
ordnance use. While signature recognition is already a major component of explosive-
ordnance-disposal training, it can also provide substantial benefits for local communi-
ties affected by landmines.  
A signature can be either the primary char-
acteristic of an item of ordnance or the second-
ary effect it creates that allows detecting devices 
to identify its presence or type. The potential 
value of signature recognition is enormous, 
ranging from the identification of hazard-
ous areas contaminated with ordnance to es-
tablishing the cause of injury during accident 
investigation. The ability to identify specific 
types of ordnance is often crucial to the selec-
tion of appropriate equipment and techniques 
for post-conflict ordnance clearance and may 
Characteristic safety caps and pins indicate the nearby presence of Belgian M409 anti-personnel mines 
in Chad.
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also provide evidence of embargo-
breaking or illegal use. With in-
tense media interest in the conduct 
of modern warfare—particularly 
the excessive use of military force—
it can also help to explain events 
and curb misguided speculation. 
Signature recognition is an im-
portant skill, yet one that tends to 
be neglected.
Types of Signatures
Ordnance signatures fall into two 
categories: The primary indicators 
are components of the weapon sys-
tem itself, with secondary effects be-
ing created in the target area upon 
initiation. Some primary indicators 
may be present even before the ord-
nance functions, as in the case of a 
minefield. Here, items such as pack-
aging, instructions and safety devic-
es can indicate not only that mines 
have been laid nearby but also iden-
tify the specific types used.
Once an item of ordnance has 
functioned, components generally 
remain in and around the point of 
initiation. There is a common mis-
conception that everything close 
to the detonation of high explosive 
is vaporized; there are even trained 
EOD operators—who should know 
better—that perpetuate this myth. 
The fact is, other than the energet-
ic material itself, very little is actual-
ly consumed during detonation, and 
what remains can provide valuable 
evidence to those willing and able to 
read the signs.
Secondary effects (those inflict-
ed on nearby objects as the ammu-
nition functions) include marks on 
the ground, damage to structures 
and vehicles, and wounds to people 
and animals. In many cases, both 
categories of indicator are present—
for example, where a fragment from 
a warhead strikes an object, inflicts 
damage and then becomes lodged in 
its target.
The Evidence on Offer
During World War II, sec-
ondary evidence of buried ord-
nance was used by EOD personnel 
to estimate the size, location and 
sometimes even the type of an un-
exploded bomb from the entry hole 
it left. Equally important was the 
ability to recognize signs of a 
“camouflet”—where a bomb had ex-
ploded deep underground without 
leaving a crater. However, while un-
exploded bombs continue to feature 
in modern conflicts, the ability to 
accurately interpret their signatures 
is increasingly rare.
Mine action is one of the few areas 
in which the value of signature rec-
ognition is recognized, with many 
organizations teaching people how 
to spot signs of danger during mine-
risk-education programs. Signa-
tures are particularly vital to MRE 
since—unlike many other types of 
ordnance—mines are unlikely to be 
seen, but liable to function when en-
countered. While communities are 
taught to identify indicators such 
as dead animals and abandoned 
military positions, soldiers and de-
miners should be looking for less 
obvious features, such as discarded 
safety devices, which may directly 
identify the type of mine used. Af-
ter an incident, there is almost al-
ways enough evidence remaining to 
identify the type of mine responsi-
ble, and even fragments recovered 
from the wounds of mine victims 
have been used for this purpose.
Similar skills have evolved for the 
location and identification of cluster 
weapons and their submunitions. 
These capabilities involve recog-
nizing parts of the delivery system 
(bomb, cargo projectile or rocket 
casing), submunition and other pay-
load components (such as ribbons 
and spacers) and impact marks.
entry holes from unexploded bombs were recognized as an important source of in-
formation by World War II eOD personnel.
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Almost anyone can be shown how 
to differentiate between the strike 
marks left by a shaped charge, a frag-
mentation warhead and a blast weap-
on; from there, a broader knowledge 
base is built from witnessing the ef-
fects of different warhead sizes and 
configurations on a range of mate-
rials. With experience and training, 
the smallest ammunition compo-
nents can further aid identification 
through their characteristic shape, 
markings or color—the shade of ol-
ive green alone is often enough to 
indicate the country of origin. As 
the operators expand and combine 
these elements of signature recogni-
tion, they should develop the ability 
to “read” a scene and understand 
the implications.
Recent Examples
A succession of recent conflicts 
has illustrated the importance of 
correct ordnance identification and 
the location of contaminated areas.
After the first Gulf War, the clear-
ance of Rockeye and other bomblets 
from soft sand became one of the 
more hazardous EOD tasks. Char-
acteristic signatures on road surfac-
es not only revealed the presence of 
strikes, but the fragmentation pat-
tern could also show the direction 
of the attack; this clue gave a good 
indication of which adjacent areas 
were likely to be contaminated.
In Lebanon, where there was ex-
tensive use of dual-purpose bomb-
lets, there was initial confusion 
over the types of submunitions 
found and their origins. Some in-
corporated a self-destruct feature, 
which had important implications 
for both clearance procedures and 
ongoing studies into the reliabili-
ty of these submunitions. EOD op-
erators and analysts soon became 
adept at identifying the various 
types from the smallest component 
variations; meanwhile, signatures 
such as internal packing, stabilizing 
ribbons and projectile base-bleed 
units provided vital indications of 
cluster strikes to both local commu-
nities and survey teams.
In Georgia, during the Oslo Pro-
cess negotiations to secure a ban 
on cluster munitions, there was in-
tense interest in whether bomblets 
had been deployed during the 2008 
empty base-bleed units from cargo projectiles were a clear indication of submunition strikes in Lebanon.
conflict with Russia and, if so, by 
which party. A number of compo-
nents and partially functioned mu-
nitions helped to build a picture 
that revealed they had indeed been 
used, including types about which 
little was known. Analysis also re-
vealed important inconsistencies, 
where components from different, 
and sometimes unrelated, systems 
had been assembled for photographs 
as “evidence” of misuse. While mis-
use may have taken place, it was not 
of the type suggested by the images.
Similar images emerged during 
the recent Israeli invasion of Gaza, 
as the media documented a num-
ber of tragic incidents involving 
civilians. Some were determined to 
prove that sinister weapons, such 
as Dense Inert Metal Explosive and 
thermobaric (enhanced blast) types, 
were being used. In several cases, 
analyses of strike signatures, wound 
characteristics and fragmentation 
allowed the munitions to be identi-
fied as anti-tank missiles with “con-
ventional” high-explosive anti-tank 
(HEAT)/fragmentation warheads. 
In one instance, several separate 
definitive indicators had to be ex-
plained to a television network be-
fore it reluctantly agreed to abandon 
the sensational story it had planned.
What’s Missing?
The absence of an indicator can 
also provide important informa-
tion, usually by eliminating an op-
tion. For example, a fragmentation 
warhead will inevitably leave marks 
on nearby exposed surfaces when 
it detonates; clearly, if there are no 
marks, then the weapon did not in-
corporate a fragmentation effect. 
However, such inferences require 
care—and sometimes a little lateral 
thinking—to avoid mistaken con-
clusions. Is it possible that the frag-
ments were caught by something, 
or someone, no longer present at 
the scene, or were so directional 
that they missed some nearby sur-
faces? Explosive events can be com-
plex and unpredictable, and bizarre 
coincidences do occur. In a school 
building in Kosovo, the base of a 
tank projectile was lodged in a hole 
that showed clear signs of detona-
tion—yet the shell was live—sug-
gesting that it had been fired into the 
hole left by a previous round.
The speculation in Gaza was 
fueled by reports from experienced 
surgeons who claimed that they 
had never seen wound characteris-
tics like these before1; however, de-
spite the horrific and unusual nature 
of some injuries, these casualties 
were the victims of “conventional” 
warheads, and it was the absence 
of signatures that most effectively 
countered the conjecture.2 In one 
case, the undisturbed and undam-
aged condition of corrugated iron 
roofing sheets near the point of det-
onation eliminated any possibility 
that a thermobaric weapon had been 
used; in another, claims that some 
weapons incorporated DIME war-
heads were quashed when forensic 
examination showed no indication 
of heavy metals, such as tungsten.
Conclusion
All too often we hear of accidents, 
disasters and tragedies in everyday 
life where hindsight shows us that 
the signs were there, but nobody 
recognized them at the time. Police 
inquiries eliminate a suspect that 
later turns out to be the perpetra-
tor or engineers overlook a flaw that 
leads to catastrophic failure. EOD 
operators are skilled technicians in 
a highly specialized and dangerous 
environment in which comprehen-
sive information can be vital. Much 
of it is readily available, if only we 
can read the signs. 
See Endnotes, Page 82
Reproduced with permission from 
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